McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003)

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332

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation. § 434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segregated fund only from its 'members,' §§ 441b(b)(4)(A), (C), which does not include those persons who have merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the past." Id., at 253-254.

These regulations are more than minor clerical requirements. Rather, they create major disincentives for speech, with the effect falling most heavily on smaller entities that often have the most difficulty bearing the costs of compliance. Even worse, for an organization that has not yet set up a PAC, spontaneous speech that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" becomes impossible, even if the group's vital interests are threatened by a piece of legislation pending before Congress on the eve of a federal election. See Brief for Appellant Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. in No. 02-1756 et al., p. 37. Couple the litany of administrative burdens with the categorical restriction limiting PACs' solicitation activities to "members," and it is apparent that PACs are inadequate substitutes for corporations in their ability to engage in unfettered expression.

Even if the newly formed PACs manage to attract members and disseminate their messages against these heavy odds, they have been forced to assume a false identity while doing so. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) points out, political committees are regulated in minute detail because their primary purpose is to influence federal elections. "The ACLU and thousands of other organizations like it," however, "are not created for this purpose and therefore should not be required to operate as if they were." Reply Brief for Appellant ACLU in No. 02-1734 et al., p. 15. A requirement that coerces corporations to adopt alter egos

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