McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 239 (2003)

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338

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

tack," "oppose"—are nowhere defined. In this respect the backup is similar to the provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act that Buckley held to be unconstitutionally vague. Cf. 424 U. S., at 39-44 (" 'No person may make any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000' ").

The statutory phrase "suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate" cannot cure the overbreadth or vagueness of the backup definition. Like other key terms in the provision, these words are not defined. The lack of guidance presents serious problems of uncertainty. If "plausible" means something close to "reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances," speakers will be provided with an insufficient degree of protection and will, as a result, engage in widespread self-censorship to avoid severe criminal penalties.

Given the statute's vagueness, even defendants' own experts disagree among themselves about whether specific ads fall within the prohibition. Hence, people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the backup definition's] meaning and differ as to its application," Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926). For these reasons, I would also invalidate the ban on electioneering communication under the backup definition.

4.

Before concluding the analysis on Title II, it is necessary to add a few words about the majority's analysis of § 204. The majority attempts to minimize the damage done under § 203 by construing § 204 (the Wellstone Amendment) to incorporate an exception for MCFL-type corporations. See MCFL, 479 U. S. 238. Section 204, however, does no such thing. As even the majority concedes, the provision "does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohi-

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