432
Syllabus
Court found Ex parte Young's rationale inapplicable to suits brought against state officials alleging state-law violations, is distinguishable from this case, which involves a federal decree entered to implement a federal statute. Enforcing the decree vindicates an agreement that the state officials reached to comply with federal law. Federal courts are not reduced to approving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, that decree may be enforced. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678. Pp. 436-440. (b) The state officials and amici state attorneys general express legitimate concerns that enforcement of consent decrees can undermine sovereign interests and accountability of state governments. However, when a consent decree is entered under Ex parte Young, the response to their concerns has its source not in the Eleventh Amendment but in the court's equitable powers and in the direction given by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which encompasses an equity court's traditional power to modify its decree in light of changed circumstances. See, e. g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S. 367. If a detailed order is required to ensure compliance with a decree for prospective relief that in effect mandates the State to administer a signifi-cant federal program, federalism principles require that state officials with front-line responsibility for the program be given latitude and substantial discretion. The federal court must ensure that when the decree's objects have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials. The basic obligations of federal law may remain the same, but the precise manner of their discharge may not. If the State establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should make the necessary changes; otherwise, the decree should be enforced according to its terms. Pp. 441-442.
300 F. 3d 530, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Susan Finkelstein Zinn argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Edward B. Cloutman III and Jane Kathryn Swanson.
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein.
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007