Cite as: 540 U. S. 614 (2004)
Breyer, J., dissenting
that hurt feelings alone constitute actual damages compensable under [26 U. S. C. § 7217(c)]. Accordingly, the jury's award of $30,000 in actual damages must be vacated. The taxpayers are each entitled to the statutory minimum award of $1,000."). As Circuit Judge Michael, dissenting from the Fourth Circuit's disposition of Doe's claim, trenchantly observed: "[T]he remedy of minimum statutory damages is a fairly common feature of federal legislation. . . . In contrast, I am not aware of any statute in which Congress has provide[d] for a statutory minimum to actual damages." 306 F. 3d 170, 195 (2002) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
* * *
Doe has standing to sue, the Court agrees, based on "allegations that he was 'torn . . . all to pieces' and 'greatly concerned and worried' because of the disclosure of his Social Security number and its potentially 'devastating' consequences." Ante, at 617-618 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Standing to sue, but not to succeed, the Court holds, unless Doe also incurred an easily arranged out-of-pocket expense. See ante, at 626, n. 10.10 In my view, Congress gave Privacy Act suitors like Doe not only standing to sue, but the right to a recovery if the fact trier credits their claims of emotional distress brought on by an agency's intentional or willful violation of the Act. For the reasons stated in this dissenting opinion, which track the reasons expressed by Circuit Judge Michael dissenting in part in the Fourth Circuit, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
I agree with Justice Ginsburg and join her opinion. I emphasize Justice Ginsburg's view that the statute (as
10 Cf. ante, at 627, n. 12 (suggesting that a nonpecuniary, but somehow heightened "adverse effect" ("demonstrated mental anxiety") might do).
641
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