Appeal No. 95-4847
Application No. 08/079,222
seem to cover the fibrin disclosed in Spears as well as that
recited in the appellant’s claims and disclosed in the
appellant’s specification.
We additionally note that claim 29 is directed to a
method comprising the single step of applying a stent
comprising a pre-formed fibrin film, which is followed by the
product-by-process limitation. In addition to the problem we
find with this which was explained above with regard to claim
1, claim 29 is limited to a single “step,” and to consider the
process limitation would add a second step and thus raise a
question of indefiniteness regarding this claim language.
For the reasons set forth above, it is our conclusion
that the combined teachings of Schatz and Spears establish a
prima facie case of obviousness with respect to the subject
matter recited in claims 1 and 29. This being the case, we
shall sustain the rejection of these two claims and, owing to
the appellant’s decision that claims 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 will
stand or fall with claim 1 (Brief, page 8), the rejection of
those claims also.
Claim 2 adds to claim 1 the requirement that “the fibrin
is a fibrin in which residual coagulating protein has been
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