Interference No. 103,345 Trademark Office, which occurred two days later, on December 23, 1992. Since this leaves the first five and one-half weeks of the critical period unaccounted for, Roberge cannot be credited with diligence during that period. See Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763, 766, 122 USPQ 530, 532 (CCPA 1959) (party held not diligent where, after making a drawing in June, the party took no other action until December 2, nearly one month after opponent's November 4 entry into the field). Roberge's failure to prove diligence means Staples is entitled to an award of priority based on his filing date, which makes it unnecessary to consider any of Staples's priority evidence. This includes the evidence that Roberge argues demonstrates abandonment, suppression, or concealment of the invention following actual reductions to practice in 1990 and 1992, when Staples constructed the first and second models of the invention. Even if abandonment, suppression, or concealment occurred, this would not have the effect of depriving Staples of the benefit of his filing date. Instead, he would be barred only from relying on those reductions to - 12 -Page: Previous 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007