Ex parte YOKOGAWA et al. - Page 13




               Appeal No. 95-2830                                                                                                     
               Application No. 07/967,617                                                                                             

               WARREN, Administrative Patent Judge, Concurring:                                                                       
                       I concur with the panel’s decision to reverse the decision of the examiner based on the record                 
               before us.  I particularly note that the bridging moiety taught by Pedrazzi contains the triazinyl group               
               and links two chromophoric moieties.  Thus, there is no similarity in structure or function between the                
               triazinyl containing bridging moiety of the compounds of Pedrazzi and the bridging moiety used to link a               
               fiber reactive moiety to a single chromophoric moiety in the compounds of Yokogawa.  See In re                         
               Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315, 203 USPQ 245, 254-55 (CCPA 1979), and cases cited therein.  I also                           
               concur that this decision carries with it the reversal of the ground of rejection based on the judicially              
               created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.                                                                 
                       I further concur in the panel’s decision to remand this case to the examiner for the examiner’s                
               consideration of Yokogawa alone with respect to the appealed claims.  It is my view that appealed                      
               claims 1, 2 and 5 through 9, which contain the formula member definition “Z is a fiber reactive group,”                
               are prima facie anticipated by the compounds disclosed by Yokogawa within the meaning of 35                            
               U.S.C. § 102(e) and prima facie obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over other teachings of this                             
               reference.  It is well settled that a reasonable interpretation must be given to the terms of an appealed              
               claim consistent with appellant's specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this            
               art.  In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz,                        
               893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  In doing so, the terms in the                            
               appealed claim must be given their ordinary meaning unless another meaning is intended by appellants.                  
               See, e.g., Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055-56, 44 USPQ2d at 1029 (“It is the applicants’ burden to                            
               precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 [statute omitted]. ”); York                     
               Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572-73, 40 USPQ2d 1619,                             
               1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996), and cases cited therein (a claim term will be given its ordinary meaning unless                 
               appellant discloses a novel use of that term); Zletz, supra (“During patent prosecution the pending                    
               claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. When the applicant states the                   

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