Appeal No. 96-1539 Application No. 08/128,456 examiner’s mere identification of Blackard’s “hardware and memory units of Figure 1" as the prior art teaching for these claimed structural and functional limitations falls far short of the burden placed on the examiner by 35 U.S.C. § 102 to show how such limitations are specifically anticipated. For their part, appellants argue, at page 7 of the principal brief, that it is “necessary...to accord the elements and their functions the meanings ascribed to them in the Specification and Figures of the Application...” We disagree. The examiner is at liberty to give the claims the broadest reasonable interpretation when applying the prior art thereagainst. The instant claims are not in “means plus function” format which would invoke the sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. At pages 7-11 of the principal brief, appellants argue many distinctions between Blackard and the instant disclosed invention, specifically delving into the particulars of Blackard’s operation, such as graph analysis and memory mapping, etc. However, up to this point, appellants have not distinguished the instant claimed subject matter from the disclosure of Blackard since no single claim limitation upon 6Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007