Interference No. 102,622
the particular application in question during the continuous
critical period." Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 1027, 231
USPQ 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (footnote [7] omitted). The
evidence presented by Oates simply does not enable us to
ascertain what activity, if any, Mr. Morris was engaged in
with respect to Oates' application on any particular date.
Thus, for example, from the date of receiving additional
information from Oates (OX-5), March 10, 1988, until the day
of Mr. Morris' letter (OX-6) transmitting the first draft of
Oates' application to Ms. Oates on April 28, 1988, some 49
(forty-nine) days, there is no evidence establishing what Mr.
Morris was doing with respect to preparing the Oates'
application for filing. Indeed, the record shows no other
activity. Reasonable diligence must be directed towards
reducing to practice the subject matter of the count.
Additionally, unlike the facts in Bey, Oates has not
shown that Mr. Morris' records establish that he took up the
five other applications he testified he worked on in the
critical period in chronological order. As the court noted in
Bey, 806 F.2d at 1028, 231 USPQ at 970, "the attorney has the
burden of keeping good records of the dates when cases are
docketed as well as the dates when specific work is done on
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