Interference 102,760
Accepting that Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, supra, teaches that
the entire inventive concept need not occur to each of the
joint inventors for Dement et al. to be properly named as
joint inventors under 35 U.S.C. § 116, Rapoport nevertheless
argues that Rosekind and Schwimmer are not joint inventors of
the invention Dement et al. claim. According to Pro-Mold &
Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1575, 37
USPQ2d 1626, 1632 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(emphasis added):
To be a joint inventor, one must contribute to the
conception of an invention. See Sewall v. Walters,
21 F.3d 411, 415, 30 USPQ2d 1356, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir.
1994); 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988). “Conception exists
when a definite and permanent idea of an operative
invention, including every feature of the subject
matter sought to be patented, is known.” Id. (citing
Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359, 224 USPQ 857,
862 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). “An idea is definite and
permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled
idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand,
not just a general goal or research plan he hopes to
pursue.” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc.,
40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 USPQ2d 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
Rapoport points to the evidence that Dement’s “contribution to
the conception of the invention was his concept, as disclosed
to Wesley Seidel prior to April 1986, of a method for
treatment of sleep apnea comprising administration of a
therapeutically effective amount of buspirone to a patient in
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