Appeal No. 1996-3330
Application 07/861,458
disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the
pertinent art." In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236,
238 (CCPA 1971). We note that the purpose of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112
is to basically insure, with a reasonable degree of particularity, an adequate notification of
the metes and bounds of what is being claimed. See In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378,
1382, 166 USPO 204, 208 (CCPA 1970). Further, the applicants may be their own
lexicographer as long as the meaning assigned to the terms is not repugnant to the term's
well known usage. In re Hill, 161 F.2d 367, 73 USPQ 482, 484 (CCPA 1947). Where an
explicit definition is provided by the applicants for a term, that definition will control
interpretation of the term as it is used in the claim. Toro Co. v. White Consolidated
Industries, Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301, 53 USPQ2d 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here,
one reading the claims in light of the specification would readily appreciate that the
terminology "structural homologue" and "multiple resemblance in structural characteristics"
have the meanings set forth at page 16 of the specification. The examiner's questioning of
the ability of one skilled in this art to "determine the entire universe of such characteristics"
would appear to reflect a concern as to whether the present disclosure would have enabled
the practice of the invention throughout the scope of subject matter encompassed by the
claim. However, this is an issue properly raised under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
and has not been presented as an issue in this appeal. Similarly, the examiner's rejection
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