Interference No. 103,352
the prosecution history of Maeda's involved application relates
in any way to an issue properly before us. Although Khokhar does
not say as much, it may be surmised that these matters relate to
questions which could have been pursued by way of preliminary
motion under 37 CFR 1.633, e.g. questions of interference-in
fact, of claim correspondence, or questions relating to the scope
of the count. However, Khokhar did not pursue any preliminary
motions. Preliminary motions which Khokhar did file were
withdrawn from consideration by Khokhar and, therefore, summarily
dismissed (See Paper No. 17, page 1, footnote 1). Questions
which could have been pursued via the preliminary motion route,
but were not, are not entitled to be raised for consideration at
final hearing. See 37 CFR 1.655(b) and Heymes w. Takaya, 6 USPQ
2d 1448, 1452 (BPAI 1988).
V.
The Maeda motion to suppress evidence is hereby dismissed as
belated since it was not filed "with" Maeda's opening brief as
required by 37 CFR 1.656(h). In fact, the motion was filed more
than three weeks after Maeda had filed its brief. Maeda was
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007