Interference No. 103,352
require the filing of a separate motion paper along with the
brief.
Additionally, dismissal of the motion is based on the fact
that Maeda did not raise a timely objection to the admissibility
of evidence introduced by Khokhar.
A party that failed to challenge the admissibility of
evidence by timely objection may not later do so at final hearing
via a motion to suppress. 37 CFR 1.656(h). In the absence of an
order setting a specific date for filing objections, a timely
objection to the admission of evidence should have been made as
soon as possible after the evidence was offered. See Myers v.
Feigelman, 455 F.2d 596, 602 n.12, 172 USPQ 580, 585 n.12,
(CCPA 1972); Rivise and Caesar, Interference Law and Practice,
Vol III, § 452, 453 (Michie Co. 1947).
Even assuming, arguendo, that Maeda had raised a timely
objection and filed its motion to suppress with its opening
brief, we find the arguments presented in the motion to be
unpersuasive on the merits at least with respect to the
admissibility of exhibits KX 3-5. In this regard, we take note
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