Interference 103,482 interpreted the language with which Dolle defines the subject matter claimed so to include impossibilities, and/or reasonably would have construed what appears to be functional language in a manner entirely inconsistent with the demands of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, 35 U.S.C. § 101, and the common sense for which persons having ordinary skill in the art have been recognized. Because Ewen’s reading of the words and phrases in Dolle’s claims is inconsistent with a fair reading of Dolle’s specification, prosecution history, art-recognized definitions, and common sense, we must deny Ewen’s motion for judgment of Dolle’s claims unpatentable under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Given our interpretation of the scope of the subject matter claimed, we must also deny Ewen’s motions for judgment that the subject matter Dolle claims is unpatentable under either the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 or 35 U.S.C. § 101. C. Ewen’s Motion for Benefit of the July 15, 1988, filing date of Application 07/220,007, now U.S. Patent 4,892,851 113Page: Previous 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007