Appeal No. 1999-0498
Application 08/532,225
and/or evidence. Obviousness is then determined on the basis
of the evidence as a whole and the relative persuasiveness of
the arguments. See Id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039,
228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re
Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).
Only those arguments actually made by appellants have been
considered in this decision. Arguments which appellants could
have made but chose not to make in the brief have not been
considered [see 37 CFR
§ 1.192(a)].
We consider first the rejection of claims 1-10, 12 and
13 based on the teachings of Shebanow, Popescu and Nguyen.
With respect to representative, independent claim 1, the
examiner asserts that the invention of claim 1 is obvious in
view of the collective teachings of the applied prior art
[answer, pages 4-5]. Appellants argue that none of the
applied prior art references teach the concept of scheduling
instruction dispatch prior to the actual computation of the
actual source data [brief, pages 6-10]. Specifically,
appellants argue that Nguyen is concerned with resource
6
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