Appeal No. 1999-1345 Page 7
Application No. 08/482,556
the facts of the instant appeal differ sufficiently from those
in Schneller, moreover, a double patenting rejection here is
inappropriate. Therefore, we reverse the rejection of claims
33-36 and 40-43 as being unpatentable over claims 1-30 of
Metlitsky. We proceed to the anticipation rejections.
II. Anticipation Rejection of Claims 33, 34, 40, and 41
We begin by noting the following principles from Rowe v.
Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
A prior art reference anticipates a claim only if
the reference discloses, either expressly or
inherently, every limitation of the claim. See
Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d
628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
"[A]bsence from the reference of any claimed element
negates anticipation." Kloster Speedsteel AB v.
Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571, 230 USPQ 81, 84
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
Of course, “‘[e]very patent application and reference relies
to some extent upon knowledge of persons skilled in the art to
complement that [which is] disclosed ....’” In re Bode, 550
F.2d 656, 660, 193 USPQ 12, 16 (CCPA 1977) (quoting In re
Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543, 179 USPQ 421, 424 (CCPA 1973)).
Those persons “must be presumed to know something” about the
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