Interference No. 104,649
Page No. 30
art: 1) would not have believed that Keagy possessed the invention set forth in Keagy's
corresponding claims; and 2) that one of ordinary skill in the art would have failed to understand
the meaning of Keagy's claims given Keagy's alleged "inconsistent" statements regarding
"reflection" and "refraction."
I . Keagy's Corresponding Claims are Definite
Zhou argues that the Keagy '744 disclosure uses the terms "reflect," "reflection,"
"refract," and "refraction," interchangeably and in a contradictory manner. According to Zhou,
an "ordinary person" reading the Keagy'744 specification would be "utterly confused" and
would not understand the type of optical phenomenon that is being described. (Paper No. 25, p,
14). Based on these alleged contradictory teachings and inconsistent use of terminology, Zhou
states that one skilled in the art would not understand what is claimed.
The proper standard for determining definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, is whether a claim reasonably apprises those of skill in the art of its scope. See In re
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361, 31 USPQ2d 1754, 1759 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217, 18 USPQ2d 10 16, 1030 (Fed. Cir.
1991). In order to determine whether a claim reasonably apprises those skilled in the art of its
scope, we must first construe the meaning of the claims.
There is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of the language of a claim,
The Federal Circuit has identified at least two situations where a sufficient reason may exist to
constrict the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term. First, where a patentee or
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