Interference No. 104,649
Page No. 31
applicant has chosen to be his or her own lexicographer by setting forth a clear definition of a
claim term. Secondly, where the terms of the claim so deprive the claim of clarity that there is no
means by which the scope of the claim may be ascertained from the language used. Johnson
Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp, 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
Zhou takes issue with the use of the terminology "reflected through total internal
reflection" as it appears in Keagy claim I due to the alleged inconsistent use of the terminology
in Kcagy's specification. Zhou, however, recognizes that the phrase "reflected through total
internal reflection" has a meaning that is "well understood by ordinary practitioners in the field of
optical sensing systems." (Paper No. 25, p. 6). As such, we look to Keagy's '744 written
description and prosecution history to determine whether Keagy has chosen to be his own
lexicographer and deliberately and clearly define this phrase in a manner that is contrary to its
ordinary meaning. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa'PerAzioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249, 48
USPQ2d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Zhou directs our attention to certain portions of the '744 specification as evidence that
Keagy has used the term "reflection" and "refraction" in a "contradictory manner that divorces
these terms from their ordinary definitions." (Paper No. 25, p. 13). In particular, Zhou cites
Keagy's statement that the rays 31, 33 and 35 of Fig. 3 are "totally internally refracted."
Furthermore, Zhou quotes Keagy's statement that rays 52 and 53 of Fig. 6 are "totally internally
reflected" whereas rays 52' and 53'are said to be "refracted." (Papar No.-25, p. 13).
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