Appeal No. 1999-1602
Application No. 08/776,957
Appellants contest the view that O’Neill discloses, as set forth in instant claim 7,
a display (e.g., Fig. 4 or 6) that indicates “an entrance hall disposed at one side of a
polygon,” and objects disposed at other respective sides of the polygon. (Brief at 9-11.)
Claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation during
prosecution, and the scope of a claim cannot be narrowed by reading disclosed
limitations into the claim. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023,
1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404, 162 USPQ 541, 550 (CCPA 1969).
There is no evidence in the record that the words such as “entrance hall area”
and “polygon” have any special meaning to the artisan. Nor do appellants point to any
particular definitions of the words in the instant specification. See In re Paulsen, 30
F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (repeating the principle that
where an inventor chooses to be his own lexicographer and gives terms uncommon
meanings, he must set out the uncommon definition in the patent disclosure). See also
Beachcombers Int’l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1158, 31
USPQ2d 1653, 1656 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“As we have repeatedly said, a patentee can be
his own lexicographer provided the patentee's definition, to the extent it differs from the
conventional definition, is clearly set forth in the specification.”); Johnson Worldwide
Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (there is a “heavy presumption” that claim language has its ordinary meaning).
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