Frohlich’s estoppel theories are ultimately based on interpretation of the settlement agreement
that ended the litigation. For example, under the equitable estoppel theory (motion at 7),
Frohlich argues that the intent of the parties at the time of settlement was to end all disputes
between the parties related to the ‘006 patent. Under the estoppel by judgment theory (motion at
9), Frohlich argues that the settlement and dismissal were intended as an all inclusive resolution
of matters involving the ‘006 patent.
Absent from the record before us is a copy of the settlement agreement. Frohlich failed
to file one. Without a copy of the agreement, we decline to speculate whether the agreement, as
described by Frohlich, prevents Baldwin from making its claims involved in the interference.
Even if Frohlich had provided a copy of the settlement agreement, the board is not in the
business of interpreting and enforcing contracts made between two parties. Frohlich has failed
to direct us to precedent that would suggest otherwise. Moreover, Frohlich is not without
remedy. Frohlich can seek enforcement of the settlement agreement in district court. Lastly,
Frohlich has failed to direct our attention to precedent that would indicate that the board must
decide equitable estoppel or estoppel by judgment issues. For these reasons, Frohlich
miscellaneous motion 1 is denied.
In addition, we deny Frohlich miscellaneous motion 1 for the following reasons.
Frohlich argues that the intent of the parties, at the time of settling the litigation, was to end all
disputes between the parties related to the ‘006 patent, including any assertion of priority of
invention (motion at 7). Frohlich directs our attention to the Lloyd Huff (Huff) affidavit and the
order entered by the district court in support of its argument as to the intent of the parties.
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