Abe et al v. Baldwin - Page 6




                      The Huff affidavit is not signed under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and is therefore an out of court                  
               statement submitted for the truth of the matter asserted and is hearsay.  Accordingly, the Huff                   
               affidavit is fatally flawed.  Even considering the Huff affidavit, the affidavit is insufficient to               
               support the argument made - that the intent of the parties was to prevent Baldwin from filing an                  
               application with claims drawn to the same patentable invention as the ‘006 patent.  Huff states                   
               that it is his understanding that the parties intention, at the time of settlement was to settle all              
               disputes against the ‘006 patent, including priority of invention (Frohlich Ex. 2001, ¶ 8).  Huff                 
               fails to provide a factual basis for his understanding.  Huff does not state what his role was                    
               during the settlement process, or how he knew the intent of the parties.  Was Huff in a meeting                   
               when the terms of the agreement were discussed?  Was he involved in drafting the agreement?                       
               We don’t know.  Huff does not tell us.  As such, we cannot and will not simply take his word as                   
               to the intent of the parties.  Accordingly, Huff’s affidavit is not credible.  See Rohm and Haas                  
               Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092, 44 USPQ2d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (nothing in                      
               the Federal Rules of Evidence or Federal Circuit jurisprudence requires the fact finder to credit                 
               the unsupported assertions of an expert witness).                                                                 
                      The district court order dismissing the parties’ claims with prejudice is based on the                     
               settlement agreement.  The order itself does not indicate that the parties intended to prevent                    
               Baldwin from filing an application having claims to the same patentable invention as Frohlich’s                   
               involved claims.  Even if we were to assume that the dismissal with prejudice applied to a claim                  
               of prior invention, such dismissal does not prevent the board from determining, as between                        
               Frohlich and Baldwin, who was the first to invent the interfering subject matter.  Frohlich                       
               recognizes that issue preclusion requires privity of the causes of action.  Yet, Frohlich fails to                

                                                            - 6 -                                                                





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next 

Last modified: November 3, 2007