Abe et al v. Baldwin - Page 9




               from Rule 633(a) and stated that:                                                                                 
                      [T]he PTO had good reason to promulgate a new rule in light of the new practice in                         
                      which patentability of claims can be considered during the motion period of an                             
                      interference.  See 37 C.F.R. 1.633(a) (effective date February 11, 1985).  Earlier case law                
                      did not deal with such a situation.  Moreover, Spina did not involve a Rule 633(a)                         
                      motion.  Thus, the PTO was writing on a clean slate, not flouting judicial precedent.                      
               Rowe, 112 F.3d at 479 n.2, 42 USPQ2d at 1554 n.2.  See also, Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley                          
               Manufacturing Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1332, 56 USPQ2d 1208, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (copied                             
               claims construed in light of specification of which they are apart).  Thus, we decline to interpret               
               Baldwin claims 20-40 and 44-49 in light of Frohlich’s specification.  Baldwin claims 20-40 and                    
               40-49, to the extent necessary, are to be construed in light of Baldwin’s specification.                          
                      Nevertheless, we address Frohlich’s argument based on the merits.  Frohlich argues that                    
               the limitation  “a layer of phase change material,” when interpreted in light of Frohlich’s                       
               specification means a solid, discrete layer of phase change material.  Frohlich argues that                       
               Baldwin’s description of a phase change material that is in liquid form contained within an                       
               envelope is not a solid, discrete layer (motion at 8-9).  Frohlich arrives at the proposed definition             
               by impermissibly adding limitations to the claim language.  Note, that such incorporation of                      
               limitations from the specification into the claims is not allowed.   In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d                    
               1181, 1186, 26 USPQ2d 1057, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (limitations are not to be read into the                        
               claims from the specification).  Claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation.                 
               In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548, 218 USPQ 385, 388 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (It is axiomatic that, in                    
               proceedings before the PTO, claims in an application are to be given their broadest reasonable                    
               interpretation consistent with the specification, and that the claim language should be read in                   
               light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art).  Frohlich             

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