Ex Parte Eckl - Page 6

            Appeal Number: 2006-1650                                                                          
            Application Number: 09/903,500                                                                    

            In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985, 78 USPQ2d 1329, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2006) citing                    
            35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13-14, 148                       
            USPQ 459, 467 (1966).  “The ultimate determination of whether an invention                        
            would have been obvious is a legal conclusion based on underlying findings of                     
            fact.” Id. (citing In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1616                       
            (Fed. Cir. 1999)).                                                                                
                    “In assessing whether subject matter would have been non-obvious under §                  
             103, the Board follows the guidance of the Supreme Court in Graham v. John                       
             Deere Co. 383 U.S. at 17, 148 USPQ at 467.  The Board determines ‘the scope                      
             and content of the prior art,’ ascertains ‘the differences between the prior art and             
             the claims at issue,’ and resolves ‘the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.’”          
             Id. (citing Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 226, 189 USPQ 257, 261 (1976))                       
             (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 USPQ at 467). “Against this background,                     
             the Board determines whether the subject matter would have been obvious to a                     
             person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the asserted invention.  Id. (citing         
             Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 USPQ 467).                                                           

                                                ANALYSIS                                                      
                   We affirm the rejection of claim 18 on two grounds.  First, the claim does                 
            not specify what delivery preference the recipient chooses to the level of detail                 
            argued by the Appellant.  The term “delivery preferences” as it appears in the                    
            preamble and in the body of the claim is broader than whether the recipient desires               
            electronic or paper mail transmission1.  The term “delivery preferences” is broad                 
                                                                                                              
            1 The specification refers to the choice of whether paper or electronic delivery is               
            preferred as a customer choice of delivery mode (emphasis added), this being one                  
            of several examples of delivery preferences enumerated on p. 4.                                   

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