Ex Parte Sakai - Page 5

                Appeal 2006-2381                                                                               
                Application 09/779,125                                                                         

                                           PRINCIPLES OF LAW                                                   
                      On appeal, Appellant bears the burden of showing that the Examiner                       
                has not established a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of                         
                obviousness.  See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598                         
                (Fed. Cir. 1988).  In so doing, the Examiner must make the factual                             
                determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148                      
                USPQ 459, 467 (1966).  These showings by the Examiner are an essential                         
                part of complying with the burden of presenting a prima facie case of                          
                obviousness.  See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443,                          
                1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the                   
                applicant to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence.                      
                Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and                     
                the relative persuasiveness of the arguments.  See id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d                 
                1038, 1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d                       
                1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re Rinehart, 531                        
                F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).                                                

                                                 ANALYSIS                                                      
                      We agree with the Examiner that although the time to temperature                         
                resulting from Egan’s heating control is stated in units of seconds (i.e., 1-5                 
                seconds), a control in units of milliseconds would nonetheless have been                       
                obvious to the skilled artisan at the time of the invention.                                   
                      Egan’s range is equivalent to 1000 to 5000 milliseconds.  Although                       
                there is a difference in three orders of magnitude between a second and a                      
                millisecond, nothing in independent claim 12 requires that the response                        


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