Ex Parte Moore et al - Page 7

                Appeal 2006-2969                                                                             
                Application 10/394,075                                                                       

                discloses the particles are deposited on the fiber surface via a dispersion                  
                which can “comprise water and may comprise additional additives,” but                        
                does not disclose that a chromium complex compound in the dispersion                         
                materially affects the basic and novel characteristics of the surface (id. 17-               
                18, citing Specification ¶¶ 0066 and 0067).  The Examiner contends Trask                     
                discloses the PTFE particles improve the hydrophobicity of the fibers (id.                   
                18-19, citing Trask col. 1, ll. 10-16, and col. 2, ll. 47-57).  The Examiner                 
                relies on the same contentions with respect to Lack and Keller (id. 19-21,                   
                citing Lack col. 1, ll. 10-16, and col. 2, ll. 47-57, and Keller col. 1,  ll. 4-9            
                and 36-42).                                                                                  
                      The issues in this appeal are whether the Examiner has carried the                     
                burden of establishing a prima facie case of anticipation in each of the                     
                grounds of rejection under §§ 102(b) and 102(e) by establishing that, as a                   
                matter of fact, each of Trask, Lack, and Keller show each and every element                  
                of the claimed invention arranged as required by claims 1 and 25, either                     
                expressly or under the principles of inherency, in a manner sufficient to have               
                placed a person of ordinary skill in the art in possession thereof.  See, e.g., In           
                re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1657 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  We                      
                note again here that Appellants rely on the same arguments with respect to                   
                the grounds of rejection under § 103(a).                                                     
                      We interpret claims 1 and 25 by giving the terms thereof the broadest                  
                reasonable interpretation in their ordinary usage in context as they would be                
                understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in light of the written                      
                description in the Specification unless another meaning is intended by                       
                Appellants as established therein, and without reading into the claim any                    


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