Appeal 2006-2969
Application 10/394,075
Appellants’ contentions based on Trask’s chromium complex, Lack’s
urea resin, and Keller’s film binder do not, of course, address the properties
of the textile materials and fabrics as a whole described to one skilled in this
art by these references. Neither do Appellants’ contentions based on
hydrophobic particle surfaces preventing water penetration of the fiber
because, on this record, the claimed textile materials and fabrics having the
discontinuous hydrophobic treatment in the same weight percent based on
the textile material and fabric as the prior art materials would reasonably
appear to prevent water penetration. Indeed, Appellants must establish that
the prior art textile materials and fabrics which otherwise satisfy the claim
limitations exhibit no increase in the water release rate near dryness, as
textile materials and fabrics which have the slightest increase in this rate are
encompassed by claims 1 and 25 as we have interpreted these claims above.
This Appellants have not done. In this respect, it is well settled that
unsupported arguments of counsel are entitled to little, if any, weight. See,
e.g., In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315, 203 USPQ 245, 256 (CCPA 1979);
In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508, 173 USPQ 356, 358 (CCPA 1972).
Accordingly, based on our consideration of the totality of the record
before us, we have weighed the evidence of anticipation found in each of
Trask, Lack, and Keller with Appellants’ countervailing evidence of and
argument for non-anticipation and conclude that the claimed invention
encompassed by appealed claims 1 through 7, 9 through 14, 16, 19, 20, and
25 through 30 would have been anticipated as a matter of fact under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 102(e) (2002) as applied by the Examiner.
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