Ex Parte George - Page 15

            Appeal Number: 2007-0133                                                                         
            Application Number: 10/223,466                                                                   

            subject matter, because [it is] non-statutory…”  In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396,              
            164 USPQ 46, 49 (CCPA. 1969).The chart is no more than an abstract                               
            representation of the ideas behind the drawing contents.  This is no more directed               
            toward a concrete, tangible and useful result than was the gray scale in Abele.  See             
            In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909, 214 USPQ 682, 685 (CCPA 1982) (where the                         
            claim presented “no more than the calculation of a number and display of the                     
            result, albeit in a particular format.”)                                                         

            Appellant’s Arguments                                                                            
                The Appellant argues that predicting sleep patterns is a useful, concrete and                
            tangible result.  We need not reach that question because, as explained supra, the               
            “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test does not apply to the present claims.               
            Further, even if one were to apply the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test,             
            the claims would not be patentable because the claimed method does no more than                  
            instruct one how to draw a chart.  The prediction of sleep and activity is recited in            
            the preamble and is merely a field of use limitation.  Moreover, the claims do not               
            recite how to achieve such a use from the steps recited.  Thus, whether predicting               
            sleep patterns is useful is moot because it is not part of the actual claim scope.  See          
            Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d                        
            1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted) (“If … the body of the claim fully               
            and intrinsically sets forth the complete invention, including all of its limitations,           
            and the preamble offers no distinct definition of any of the claimed invention's                 
            limitations, but rather merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of               
            the invention, then the preamble is of no significance to claim construction because             
            it cannot be said to constitute or explain a claim limitation.”).                                


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