Ex Parte George - Page 6

            Appeal Number: 2007-0133                                                                         
            Application Number: 10/223,466                                                                   

            Both are ‘conception[s] of the mind, seen only by [their] effects when being                     
            executed or performed.’”  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (quoting                
            Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880)).  “The holding that the discovery                 
            of [Benson’s] method could not be patented as a ‘process’ forecloses a purely                    
            literal reading of § 101.”  Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.  The Supreme Court has                       
            recognized only two instances in which a method may qualify as a section 101                     
            process: when the process “either [1] was tied to a particular apparatus or                      
            [2] operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” Id. at 588 n.9                
            (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-788 (1877) (“A process is...an act,                
            or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and                     
            reduced to a different state or thing”)).  “[W]hen a claim containing [an abstract               
            idea] implements or applies that [idea] in a structure or process which, when                    
            considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were                       
            designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or           
            thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.”  Diamond v. Diehr, 450              
            U.S. 175, 192 (1981); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)                      
            (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the              
            clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular                    
            machines.”).                                                                                     
                The Supreme Court, however, presumably concerned about barring patents for                   
            future, unforeseeable technologies, declined to rule on whether its precedent                    
            foreclosed any other possible avenues for a method claim to qualify as a section                 
            101 process:  “It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular            
            machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different             
            state or thing.’  We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did             


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