Appeal 2007-0690
Application 10/224,917
that reference, and thus do not address or otherwise meet all of these rather
narrow requirements. We cannot, therefore, conclude that the reference
necessarily teaches the restrictive enablement conditions required by the
wherein clause.
Therefore, as indicated earlier, since we reverse the rejection under
Section 102 of each independent claim 1, 15, 18, and 22 as being anticipated
by Jones ‘638, we will also not sustain each of the respective rejections
relying on this reference under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
We reach a corresponding conclusion as to the separate rejection
under Section 102 relying upon Leanheart as to independent claims 1, 15,
and 18, and the separately stated rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of
independent claim 22 relying upon Leanheart in view of Jones ‘638. We
find ourselves in general agreement with Appellants’ corresponding and
similar arguments made at pages 14 through 16 of the Brief as to these
rejections relying upon Leanheart to the extent they focus upon the wherein
clause and the absence of significant, compelling teachings of Leanheart
meeting the functional requirements of the wherein clause.
The Examiner’s responsive remarks between pages 35 and 42 of the
Answer addressing this wherein clause are equally deficient for the same
reasons as we noted earlier. We simply do not agree with the Examiner’s
interpretation of the language of this wherein clause and its application to
the teachings in Leanheart and to the combination of Leanheart and Jones
‘638. Therefore, in a corresponding manner, since we do not sustain the
rejection relying upon Leanheart to anticipate independent claims 1, 15, and
18, the separate rejections of their respective dependent claims under 35
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