Appeal 2007-0726
Application 10/264,561
(“[a]ccommodating a prior art mechanical device that accomplishes [a
known goal associated with learning the sounds of letters] to modern
electronics would have been reasonably obvious to one of ordinary skill in
designing children’s learning devices”). In reaching that conclusion, the
Federal Circuit recognized that “[a]n obviousness determination is not the
result of a rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a
case. Indeed, the common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why
some combinations would have been obvious where others would not.”
Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1161, 82 USPQ2d at 1690-91 (citing KSR, 127 S. Ct.
1727, 1739, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (“The combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results.”). The Federal Circuit relied in part
on the fact that Leapfrog had presented no evidence that the inclusion of a
reader in the combined device was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one
of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior
art.” Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162, 82 USPQ2d at 1692 (citing KSR, 127 S.
Ct. at 1740-41, 82 USPQ2d at 1396).
The obviousness determination is made from the vantage point of the
person of ordinary skill in the art. That person is a “hypothetical person who
is presumed to know the relevant prior art.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573,
1579, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “In determining this skill
level, the court may consider various factors including ‘type of problems
encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with
which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and
educational level of active workers in the field.’” Id. “In a given case, every
factor may not be present, and one or more factors may predominate.” Id.
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