Appeal 2007-1478
Application 10/359,861
ISSUES
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) is in error.2 Appellant asserts that the Examiner “gratuitously and
selectively substitutes parts of Applicant’s application for a part of the Rice
patent.” (Br. 11, heading C.) Further, Appellant argues that “Rice does not
encompass direct illumination upon the face of a reflectorized metallic
license plate.” (Id. at 12.) 3 Rather, Appellant states that Rice uses indirect
illumination of a translucent license plate (Id.). In the Reply Brief,
Appellant presents similar arguments differentiating illumination of a
reflective license plate from illumination of a translucent license plate such
as taught by Rice.
The Examiner states:
[First,] Appellant does not recite the reflectorised metallic license
plate in the claim. Second, Appellant does not define the meaning of
the word "directly" in the specification. When Appellant does not
define the meaning of the claim in the specification, the words of a
claim must be given their plain meaning. In other words, they must be
read as they would be interpreted by those of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Sneed, 710 F2d 1544, 218 USPQ 385 (Fed. Cir. 1983). If the
two lighting elements of Rice are illuminating the license plate behind
the license plate without any beam direction modification means, then
Examiner must assume that the two lighting elements are illuminating
the license plate directly, which is a plain meaning of the word.
2 We note that Appellant present several arguments directed to a rejection
based upon Solow. (Br. 6-10). However, the Examiner has indicated that
the rejection based upon Solow has been withdrawn. Answer 4.
Accordingly, the rejection based upon Solow is not before us.
4
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