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Petitioners first argue that they are similarly situated to
Elliot Miller (Miller), the taxpayer in the Miller cases, and
that therefore they are entitled to the same settlement agreement
executed by respondent and Miller in those cases.
Under the principle of "equality," the Commissioner has a
duty of consistency toward similarly situated taxpayers and
cannot tax one and not tax another without some rational basis
for the difference. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308
(1960) (concurring opinion); see Baker v. United States, 748 F.2d
1465 (11th Cir. 1984); Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. United
States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973). Essentially, the principle
of equality precludes the Commissioner from making arbitrary
distinctions between like cases. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787
F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacating 83 T.C. 822 (1984).
The different tax treatment accorded petitioners and Miller
was not arbitrary or irrational. While petitioners and Miller
both invested in the Plastics Recycling project,9 their actions
with respect to such investments provide a rational basis for
treating them differently. Miller foreclosed any potential
liability for increased interest in his cases by making payments
prior to December 31, 1984; no interest accrued after that date.
9 The Millers were Schedule C owners of Sentinel EPE
recyclers, while petitioners owned interests in limited
partnerships that owned Sentinel EPE recyclers. We consider this
difference to be negligible and of no consequence. See Estate of
Satin v. Commissioner, supra; Fisher v. Commissioner, supra.
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