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Petitioners also argue that paragraph 4 of the piggyback
agreement extends the controlling case to all cases not expressly
a part of or referenced in the agreement, such as docket No.
28082-89. Paragraph 4 provides:
If the adjustment is resolved in the CONTROLLING CASE
in a manner which affects the same issue in other years
(e.g., * losses in later years or affects depreciation
schedules), the resolution will apply to petitioner(s)'
later years as if the petitioner(s) in this case
was/were the same as the taxpayer(s) in the CONTROLLING
CASE; [Emphasis added.]
We disagree with petitioners' interpretation of paragraph 4.
Paragraph 4 merely provides that if the result in the controlling
case affects a continuing item in other or later years in the
controlling case, then the resolution will apply in the same
manner to other or later years of the same continuing item in
petitioners' case; it does not extend the result to other cases
not a part of the agreement. See Conway v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-413 (interpreting a similar stipulation); sec.
301.7121-1(b)(3) and (4), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The piggyback
agreement is exclusively for docket No. 1173-88; no other case is
explicitly or implicitly referenced or incorporated therein.
Petitioners' motion is not supported by the piggyback agreement
for docket No. 1173-88.
Finally, petitioners contend that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel should apply to bar respondent from assessing penalties
other than those assessed in the Miller cases. We note that this
Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general
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