- 15 - In contrast, petitioners concede that the increased rate of interest under section 6621(c) applies in this case. Liability for the increased rate of interest is one of the principal differences between the settlement in the Miller cases and the settlement offer rejected by petitioners. Accordingly, with respect to the section 6621(c) issue, petitioners and Miller were treated equally to the extent they were similarly situated, and differently to the extent they were not. With respect to the other differences, i.e., the section 6653(a) addition to tax and the 50-percent loss deductions, petitioners rejected a settlement offer made to them prior to trial of a test case. Miller negotiated for himself and accepted an offer that was essentially the same prior to trial. In their motion, petitioners seek the benefits of the settlement after trial of the test case. Miller obtained no such benefit. Petitioners' motion is not supported by the principle of equality. Cf. Baratelli v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-484. Next, petitioners argue that the piggyback agreement they executed for docket No. 1173-88 entitles them to the Miller settlement in docket No. 28082-89. Petitioners maintain that the scope of the piggyback agreement includes cases that concern 1982, such as docket No. 28082-89. A settlement stipulation is a contract. Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-412. General principles of contract law are applied in construing a settlement agreement.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
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