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In contrast, petitioners concede that the increased rate of
interest under section 6621(c) applies in this case. Liability
for the increased rate of interest is one of the principal
differences between the settlement in the Miller cases and the
settlement offer rejected by petitioners. Accordingly, with
respect to the section 6621(c) issue, petitioners and Miller were
treated equally to the extent they were similarly situated, and
differently to the extent they were not. With respect to the
other differences, i.e., the section 6653(a) addition to tax and
the 50-percent loss deductions, petitioners rejected a settlement
offer made to them prior to trial of a test case. Miller
negotiated for himself and accepted an offer that was essentially
the same prior to trial. In their motion, petitioners seek the
benefits of the settlement after trial of the test case. Miller
obtained no such benefit. Petitioners' motion is not supported
by the principle of equality. Cf. Baratelli v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1994-484.
Next, petitioners argue that the piggyback agreement they
executed for docket No. 1173-88 entitles them to the Miller
settlement in docket No. 28082-89. Petitioners maintain that the
scope of the piggyback agreement includes cases that concern
1982, such as docket No. 28082-89.
A settlement stipulation is a contract. Smith v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-412. General principles of
contract law are applied in construing a settlement agreement.
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