Ralph Leon Hays, Jr., - Page 6

                                        - 6 -                                         
          Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943); Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery            
          Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946).                                                   
               The standard for determining whether a remittance is a                 
          payment or deposit was set forth in Risman v. Commissioner, 100             
          T.C. 191, 197 (1993), as follows:                                           
                    A remittance by a taxpayer to respondent generally                
               will not be regarded as a payment of Federal income tax                
               until the taxpayer intends that the remittance satisfy                 
               what the taxpayer regards as an existing tax liability.                
               See Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658, 661-662                   
               (1945); Ewing v. United States, * * * [914 F.2d 499] at                
               503-504 [(4th Cir. 1990)]; Fortugno v. Commissioner,                   
               353 F.2d 429, 435 (3d Cir. 1965), affg. 41 T.C. 316,                   
               322 (1963); see also Perkins v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.                  
               749, 754-759 (1989).  Until such time and absent such                  
               intent, a remittance by a taxpayer to respondent                       
               generally will be regarded, not as a payment of tax,                   
               but merely as a deposit in the nature of a cash bond                   
               with respect to a tax liability that is to be                          
               determined at a later point in time.                                   
                   *       *      *       *      *      *      *                      
                    A taxpayer's intent to have a remittance treated                  
               as a payment or as a mere deposit is generally to be                   
               established by all of the relevant facts and                           
               circumstances associated with the remittance.  Ewing v.                
               United States, supra at 503; Ameel v. United States,                   
               426 F.2d 1270, 1273 (6th Cir. 1970); Dowell v.                         
               Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-515, affd. without                       
               published opinion (10th Cir., Jan. 19, 1983), vacated                  
               on other grounds 465 U.S. 1001 (1984).                                 



               5(...continued)                                                        
          remittance was a payment for 1980 and considered paid as of                 
          Apr. 15, 1981, the time limitations of sec. 6511(b)(2) would                
          apply to prohibit the credit of the payment, claim for which was            
          made in 1993, when petitioner filed his income tax returns for              
          1980, 1981, and 1982.  If the $31,000 remittance was a deposit,             
          sec. 6511(b)(2)(A) would be applied from the time the deposit was           
          applied as a payment.  In the setting of this case, petitioner              
          contends that the remittance was a deposit, which he directed as            
          a payment by filing his 1980, 1981, and 1982 returns in 1993                
          seeking to apply the deposit as a payment of any deficiency that            
          may be due.                                                                 

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