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$31,000 remittance to be specifically or exclusively for the 1980
tax year under these circumstances.
Respondent argues that the remittance was treated by the
Internal Revenue Service as an estimated tax payment.7 By
analogy, respondent cites Gabelman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1993-592, on appeal (6th Cir., Mar. 3, 1995), where we decided
that remittances submitted with Forms 4868 (Applications for
Automatic Extension of Time To File U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return) were payments of tax. In that case we pointed out that
“Generally, a remittance by a taxpayer to respondent will not be
considered a payment ‘until the taxpayer intends that the
remittance satisfy what the taxpayer regards as an existing tax
liability’” (emphasis supplied) (quoting Risman v. Commissioner,
supra at 197). From all of the facts in that case, including the
language on the Form 4868 and the fact that the taxpayer had
estimated the tax liability due on the application for an
extension of time to file, we held that the remittances were
payments. The facts of this case are obviously distinguishable
from those of Gabelman v. Commissioner, supra.
Under the subjective standard established by case law,
respondent’s treatment of the remittance is not conclusive,
although it is one of the factors to be considered. The question
here is not parallel with situations where an essentially
objective standard is employed in attempting to decide whether a
7 Respondent admitted on brief that she was unable to locate
any declaration of estimated income tax form accompanying the
$31,000 check.
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