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fications of each expert and all other evidence in the record.
Estate of Christ v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir.
1973), affg. 54 T.C. 493 (1970); IT&S of Iowa, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 97 T.C. 496, 508 (1991); Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.
547, 561 (1986). We have broad discretion to evaluate "'the
overall cogency of each expert's analysis.'" Sammons v. Commis-
sioner, 838 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Ebben v.
Commissioner, 783 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. in part
and revg. in part on another issue T.C. Memo. 1986-318. We are
not bound by the formulae and opinions proffered by an expert,
especially when they are contrary to our own judgment. Orth v.
Commissioner, 813 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1987), affg. Lio v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 56 (1985); Silverman v. Commissioner, 538
F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976), affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-285; Estate
of Kreis v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1955),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1954-139. Instead, we may reach a decision
based on our own analysis of all the evidence in the record.
Silverman v. Commissioner, supra at 933. The persuasiveness of
an expert's opinion depends largely upon the disclosed facts on
which it is based. See Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432, 434
(7th Cir. 1964), affg. T.C. Memo. 1963-244. While we may accept
the opinion of an expert in its entirety, Buffalo Tool & Die
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980), we
may be selective in the use of any portion of such an opinion.
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