22
1984)); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Stoller, 380 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Neb.
1986) (decided under Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 36-401 (reissue 1978)
(since repealed and replaced by the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyances Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. secs. 36-602, 36-603, 36-604,
36-607 (reissue 1988))).5 The party defending the transfer bears
the burden of proving that an interspousal transfer was made for
fair consideration. Brown v. Borland, supra at 16. To rebut
this presumption, petitioner must show that she paid fair
consideration for the Packerland note or that Stanko's intent in
making the transfer was not fraudulent. See United States v.
Thomassen, 610 F. Supp. 386, 392-393 (D. Neb. 1985) (decided
under Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 36-401 (reissue 1978)); Gifford-Hill &
Co. v. Stoller, supra. As discussed next and at par. C-3,
petitioner has shown neither.
Petitioner argues that she gave consideration for the note
because: (a) She was entitled to a one-half marital interest in
Stanko Packing's assets; (b) she accepted the note in
satisfaction of her right to a division of the other marital
5Under Nebraska's predecessor fraudulent conveyances statute
(Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 36-401), a conveyance made with intent to
defraud creditors was void. Badges of fraud and presumptions
were developed through case law. Sec. 36-607 of the Revised
Statutes of Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 36-607 (reissue 1988))
preserved the distinction between "intent presumed at law" and
"intent to defraud". Thus, the rules on badges of fraud and
their presumptions are still in effect under the uniform act.
Brown v. Borland, 432 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Neb. 1988).
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