27
show that he may have been hiding assets in an attempt to hinder
or delay his creditors.
The District Court for Nebraska found that later transfers
from Stanko to petitioner were fraudulent. Giove v. Stanko, No.
CV89-L-236 (D. Neb., Jan. 11, 1991), affd. 977 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.
1992). This indicates that Stanko's transfer of the Packerland
note to petitioner was part of a pattern of transferring assets
and depleting his estate in an attempt to hinder, delay, or
defraud his creditors. Evidence of prior or subsequent acts is
relevant to prove intent or state of mind where they appear to be
part of a pattern. United States v. King, 768 F.2d 586, 587-588
(4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 217 (4th
Cir. 1982).
We conclude that Stanko transferred the Packerland note to
petitioner with the actual intent to delay, defraud, or hinder
his creditors. Accordingly, we hold that Stanko's transfer of
the Packerland note to petitioner was a fraudulent conveyance
under section 36-607 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska (Neb.
Rev. Stat. sec. 36-607 (reissue 1988)).7
7Respondent also contends that petitioner is collaterally
estopped by Giove v. Stanko, No. CV89-L-236 (D. Neb., Jan. 11,
1991), affd. 977 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1992), from denying that
Stanko's transfer of the Packerland note to petitioner was
fraudulent as to his then-existing and future creditors. Based
on our holding that Stanko's transfer of the note to petitioner
was a fraudulent conveyance under Nebraska law, we need not reach
this issue.
Page: Previous 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011