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the note; any tax liability on the income from the note was
petitioner's since she received the income from the note.
Finally, petitioner testified that she did not ask for
alimony or temporary support because she had the Packerland note,
and claims that she waived future alimony, maintenance, or child
support when she received the note from Stanko. Even if she did,
a waiver would not have been consideration for the Packerland
note. See Brown v. Borland, supra at 17. Petitioner and
Stanko's divorce proceeding had not yet begun when Stanko
transferred the note to petitioner. Stanko filed for divorce in
July 1985, nearly a year after he transferred the note to her.
Petitioner has not shown that she would have been awarded alimony
or maintenance in her divorce from Stanko. Repayment of an
antecedent debt (that is, a debt existing at the time of the
transfer) can be fair consideration for transferred property for
purposes of sections 36-603 and 36-607 of the Revised Statutes of
Nebraska. See Schall v. Anderson's Implement, Inc., 484 N.W.2d
86, 90 (Neb. 1992). However, liability for alimony or child
support that may arise in the future is not an antecedent debt
for purposes of sections 36-603 and 36-607 of the Revised
Statutes of Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. secs. 36-603, 36-607
(reissue 1988)). See Brown v. Borland, supra at 17. We hold
that petitioner did not give fair consideration for the note.
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