- 10 - addition to the methods set forth therein, the exchange of petitioner’s interest in RPDS for like-kind property may be effected in any other manner mutually satisfactory to the parties thereto. Respondent concedes that it was not necessary for the Labbes to take title to Hillview in order for the exchange of petitioner’s interest in RPDS for such property to meet the requirements of section 1031(a). See Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d at 1177. Consequently, we do not consider it significant, for purposes of section 1031(a), that the parties to the amendment did not follow the procedure for acquiring the replacement property (i.e., Hillview). Moreover, by their conduct, we treat petitioner and the Labbes as having adopted, pursuant to the provisions of the amendment, a mutually satisfactory alternative method for accomplishing the exchange of petitioner’s interest in RPDS for Hillview. We next consider respondent’s argument concerning the provisions of section 1031(a)(3). As noted above, respondent argues that petitioner’s identification of replacement properties did not satisfy section 1031(a)(3)(A) because (1) petitioner identified 20 properties as replacement properties, and (2) the particular replacement properties to be received were not to be determined by contingencies beyond the control of the parties to the exchange. Respondent relies on the following passage in the conference report on DEFRA:Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
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