- 12 -
T.D. 8346, 1991-1 C.B. at 165. The Commissioner included no
requirement in the regulations that the particular replacement
property to be received by a taxpayer be determined by
contingencies beyond the control of the parties to the exchange.
Sec. 1.1031(k)-1(c), Income Tax Regs., T.D. 8346, 1991-1 C.B. at
156.
Petitioner argues that section 1031(a)(3)(A) does not
expressly limit to less than 20 the number of replacement
properties that may be designated and that the exchange of
petitioner’s interest in RPDS for Hillview complied with the
literal language of section 1031(a)(3). We agree.
As the regulations are not before us, the issue presented in
the instant case is one of statutory interpretation. In
construing section 1031(a)(3)(A), our task is to give effect to
the intent of Congress, and we must begin with the statutory
language, which is the most persuasive evidence of the statutory
purpose. United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.
310 U.S. 534, 542-543 (1940). Ordinarily, the plain meaning of
the statutory language is conclusive. United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-242 (1989). Where a statute is
silent or ambiguous, we may look to legislative history in an
effort to ascertain congressional intent.2 Burlington No. R. Co.
2
Of course, even where the statutory language appears to be
clear, we are not precluded from consulting legislative history.
(continued...)
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