Raymond St. Laurent - Page 17

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          would satisfy the statutory requirement.  It does not appear to             
          mean, even by implication, that an identification of multiple               
          properties without a contingency would not satisfy the                      
          identification requirement.  As with the number of replacement              
          properties that may be identified, we similarly consider the                
          conference report inconclusive as to any contingency requirement.           
          As noted above, the Commissioner did not see fit to adopt such a            
          requirement in the regulations.  We do not believe that our                 
          construction of the statute as not imposing a contingency                   
          requirement would make the identification requirement                       
          meaningless.  Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Congress               
          intended that an identification of replacement properties would             
          satisfy the identification requirement only if the particular               
          property to be received were to be determined by contingencies              
          beyond the control of the parties to an exchange.                           
               Consequently, we conclude that petitioner made a valid                 
          identification of replacement properties within the statutorily             
          prescribed period and that Hillview constitutes property of a               
          like kind received in exchange for petitioner’s interest in RPDS            
          pursuant to section 1031(a)(3).                                             
               Petitioner’s exchange of his interest in RPDS for the                  
          Sheffield lot, however, does not qualify as a like-kind exchange            
          pursuant to the provisions of section 1031(a)(3).  As noted                 
          above, section 1031(a)(3)(B) provides that, in order to be                  
          considered like-kind property, replacement property may not be              




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