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does not specify the number. The foregoing sentence from the
conference report is also vague in that it is a statement of what
will pass muster under the statute; it does not purport to define
what will not satisfy the statute. Although the example given in
the conference report mentions only two properties, as we read
the example, it merely illustrates a contingent exchange
arrangement that would qualify for like-kind treatment. It does
not purport to restrict to two the maximum number of properties
that may be identified. Id. Moreover, it should be noted that
the primary concern addressed by Congress in amending section
1031(a) was to prevent long periods of delay between the exchange
of properties, as was present in the case of Starker v. United
States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) (where the exchange could
have occurred up to 5 years after the initial transaction). See
H. Conf. Rept. 98-861, supra at 866, 1984-3 C.B. (Vol 2) at 120.
Nonetheless, we do believe that Congress intended that
taxpayers identify only a finite number of replacement
properties.3 To construe the statute otherwise, i.e., as
3
We note the following dictionary definitions of the word
“limited”: “Confined within limits, restricted in extent,
number, or duration”, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (1993); “Restricted; bounded; prescribed. Confined
within positive bounds; restricted in duration, extent, or
scope”, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); “confined or
restricted within certain limits”, Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1984). Petitioner’s identification of
replacement properties was “limited” within the everyday,
ordinary meaning of the term. Cf. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S.
(continued...)
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