- 23 -
did not, within the plain meaning of section 4975(c)(1)(A),
qualify as a "sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property
between a plan and a disqualified person".16 Therefore,
respondent's litigation position with respect to this issue was
unreasonable as a matter of both law and fact.
We also find that respondent was not substantially justified
in maintaining that the payments of dividends by Worldwide to IRA
#1 qualified as prohibited transactions under section
4975(c)(1)(E). There is no support in that section for
respondent's contention that such payments constituted acts of
self-dealing, whereby petitioner, a "fiduciary", was dealing with
15(...continued)
4975(e)(2)(H) solely due to his "shareholding" in Worldwide as
the constructive attribution rules provided under sec. 267 are
applicable only to sec. 4975(e)(2)(E)(i) and (G)(i). Sec.
4975(e)(4).
16
Ordinarily, controlling effect will be given to the plain
language of a statute unless to do so would produce absurd or
futile results. Rath v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 196, 200 (1993)
(citing United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S.
534, 543-544 (1940)). As the Supreme Court has stated:
in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, the language of the statute
itself must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.
Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise,
when we find the terms of a statute unambiguous,
judicial inquiry is complete. [Burlington No. R. v.
Oklahoma Tax Commn., 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987);
citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]
Accordingly, when, as here, a statute is clear on its face, we
require unequivocal evidence of a contrary purpose before
construing it in a manner that overrides the plain meaning of the
statutory words. Rath v. Commissioner, supra at 200-201 (citing
Halpern v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 895, 899 (1991); Huntsberry v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-748 (1984)).
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