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litigation”, it might well have concluded that such agreement
should be enforced. It concluded, however, that this Court had
not erred as a matter of law in reaching its conclusion. This
Court, however, has not been consistent in interpreting (or even
acknowledging) the Cole case. For example, in Nelson Bros., Inc.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-52, we cast doubt on whether an
agreement could be repudiated before trial. We emphasized what
we had said in the Cole case about the mere signing of a proposed
stipulation not always being sufficient evidence that the parties
were in agreement. We continued:
Instead, delivery of the stipulation or other
appropriate action would be needed in order for this
Court to accept that a binding agreement was reached by
the parties. Therefore, [in the Cole case] we did not
state that the parties, while in agreement before
trial, could cancel the agreement if they were no
longer in agreement when the case was called for trial.
* * *
Id. In Haiduk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-506, we enforced
a settlement agreement evidenced only by an exchange of letters
between the parties. We did not even mention the Cole case. The
repudiation language in the Cole case does not recite a rule of
contract law. Cf. Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, supra at 573.
It appears to implement this Court’s inherent power to regulate
what will be tried before it. See Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
at 176. We have reconsidered the Cole case, and we can see no
reason to empower a party to a settlement agreement with the
authority unilaterally to set that agreement aside. Upon a
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