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the trial date and would have led to entry of decisions had the
parties complied with their agreement and the Court’s order with
respect to settlement documents. Id. at 321. Because of those
circumstances, we stated that more stringent standards were
applicable than the criteria set forth in Adams v. Commissioner,
supra. We stated that the moving party had to satisfy standards
akin to those applicable in vacating a judgment entered into by
consent: “In such cases, the parties are held to their agreement
without regard to whether the judgment is correct on the merits.”
Id. at 322. Absent a showing of lack of formal consent, fraud,
mistake, or some similar ground, a judgment entered by consent
will be upheld. E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
311, 324 (1928). Those same principles are applicable here. The
Court struck the 1993 docketed cases from the November 8 special
trial session in reliance on the representation made by the
parties that they had reached a basis for settlement. Dorchester
and Frank Wheaton have failed to prove fraud, mistake, or some
similar ground; accordingly they are bound by the terms of the
settlement with respect to the 1993 docketed cases.
The situation is different with respect to the case at
docket No. 23092-94 (the 1994 docketed case), which deals with
Frank and Mary Wheaton’s 1990 tax year. The 1994 docketed case
was not set for trial at the November 8 special trial session.
It was noticed for trial on May 13, 1996, in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (which trial was continued). Trial was not imminent
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