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on November 6, 1995, when respondent and Frank Wheaton entered
into the settlement agreement. The 1994 docketed case is, thus,
unlike Himmelwright v. Commissioner, supra, and we need not apply
the stringent eve-of-trial standards of Stamm Intl. Corp. v.
Commissioner, supra. For good cause shown, we may refuse to
implement the settlement agreement as it applies to the 1994
docketed case. Cf. Saigh v. Commissioner, supra at 176 (stating
that rule with respect to a settlement stipulation). We apply
the criteria set forth in Adams v. Commissioner, supra.
Since the settlement agreement entered into by respondent
and petitioners amounts to a virtual capitulation by petitioners,
it does not appear that respondent gave up much of anything to
get a settlement of the 1994 docketed case or would be
substantially injured were we to modify the settlement agreement
with respect to the 1994 docketed case. Respondent might be
forced to try that case, but that possibility exists for any
decision to set aside a settlement agreement. If attention is
focused only on the 1994 docketed case, the Court has not been
unduly inconvenienced. Nevertheless, Frank Wheaton has failed to
prove that a failure to modify the settlement agreement would
result in an injustice being done to him. He consulted with four
attorneys after receiving respondent’s settlement proposal. Two
of those attorneys, Richard F. Riley and K. Martin Worthy, are
experienced tax attorneys. Frank Wheaton has not alleged that
respondent tried to deceive him by including the 1994 docketed
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