Dorchester Industries Incorporated, et al. - Page 22

                                       - 22 -                                         
          Nevertheless: “The law is well established that a court has some            
          power to set aside a settlement stipulation filed with it but its           
          discretion will not be exercised unless good cause is shown.”               
          Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171, 176 (1956).  In Adams v.                
          Commissioner, 85 T.C. 359, 375 (1985), we set forth criteria                
          appropriate for determining when we should exercise our                     
          discretion to modify or set aside a settlement stipulation:                 
               The party seeking modification * * * must show that the                
               failure to allow the modification might prejudice him.                 
               * * *  Discretion should be exercised to allow                         
               modification where no substantial injury will be                       
               occasioned to the opposing party; refusal to allow                     
               modification might result in injustice to the moving                   
               party; and the inconvenience to the Court is slight.                   
               * * *  [Citations omitted.]                                            
               In Himmelwright v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-114, we               
          faced a situation similar to that which we face with respect to             
          the 1993 docketed cases.  In the Himmelwright case, we had                  
          canceled a trial in reliance on the representation of counsel for           
          one of the parties that a settlement agreement had been reached.            
          We enforced that agreement, memorialized in a letter from the               
          taxpayer’s counsel to the Commissioner’s counsel, by analogizing            
          the taxpayer’s request to be relieved of the agreement to a                 
          motion to vacate a settlement agreement filed on the eve of                 
          trial.  In Stamm Intl. Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315 (1988),           
          the Commissioner moved to vacate a settlement agreement                     
          negotiated shortly before trial was scheduled to commence.  We              
          stated that the settlement agreement had led to the vacation of             





Page:  Previous  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011