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518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The moving party bears the burden of
proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and
factual inferences will be read in a manner most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344
(1982).
The Court has often relied upon the test case process as an
expedient means for resolving tax shelter projects comprising
large numbers of cases presenting common questions of law and
fact. See Ryback v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524 (1988); Clayden v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 656 (1988); Anderson v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 898 (1984), affd. without published opinion 846 F.2d 76
(10th Cir. 1988); Sennett v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 694 (1978).
As a practical matter, the effectiveness of the test case process
depends in large part upon the agreement of the affected parties
to be bound by the outcome in the test case.
A settlement stipulation, such as a stipulation to be bound
to a test case, is "in all essential characteristics a mutual
contract" that is "entitled to all of the sanctity of any other
contract." Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171, 177 (1956); see
Fisher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-434; Estate of Satin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-435. In this regard, general
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